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Abstract 
Following a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector during the 1980s and the 
subsequent massive credit expansion, a banking crisis in Finland caused a sharp 
contraction in the economy in the early 1990s. One of the key policy responses to the crisis 
was the creation of an asset management company called Arsenal in 1992. The original 
purpose of Arsenal was to absorb, manage, and liquidate the bad assets of the Savings Bank 
of Finland (an entity created by the government-forced merger of 41 of the country’s 81 
savings banks). During the following years, Arsenal expanded to become a group of 
multiple asset management companies dealing with the bad assets of other failed entities. 
The Arsenal Group, as the group later came to be known, was ultimately responsible for 
managing more than FIM 40 billion (approx. $8.1 billion) in assets. By 1999 more than 90% 
of the assets had been wound down. Arsenal was not placed in liquidation until 2003, at 
which time losses had reached nearly FIM 20 billion. In the most recent available financial 
statements, Arsenal reported that it was down to one employee with just a handful of 
assets outstanding in domestic and foreign bankruptcy court that were expected to be 
finalized within three years, at which point Arsenal would be dissolved.  
Keywords: asset management company, Arsenal, Finland, Government Guarantee Fund, 
Nordic banking crisis, Savings Bank of Finland , broad-based asset  management 
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 






At a Glance 
Following a large-scale deregulation 
of the financial sector during the 
1980s and the subsequent massive 
credit expansion, a banking crisis in 
Finland caused a sharp contraction in 
the economy in the early 1990s. One 
of the key policy responses to the 
crisis was the creation of an asset 
management company called Arsenal 
in 1992. The original purpose of 
Arsenal was to absorb, manage, and 
liquidate the bad assets of the Savings 
Bank of Finland (an entity created by 
the government-forced merger of 41 
of the country’s 81 savings banks).  
Arsenal was wholly government 
owned, with the Government of 
Finland owning 74% of the shares 
and an off-state-balance-sheet fund 
holding the remainder, and received 
an unconditional guarantee of up to 
23 billion Finnish markkas (FIM) 
($4.7 billion) for bonds issued by 
Arsenal itself.3 Arsenal acquired the 
assets of the Savings Bank of Finland 
at their original book value, which 
was significantly greater than their 
market value at the time, using the 
Arsenal bonds guaranteed by the 
Finnish government (Arsenal 1994). 
During the following years, Arsenal expanded to become a group of multiple asset 
management companies dealing with the bad assets of other failed entities. The Arsenal 
Group was ultimately responsible for managing more than FIM 40 billion in assets. By 1999 
more than 90% of the assets had been wound down. Arsenal was not placed in liquidation 
 
3 FIM 4.936 = 1 USD during the time period in question (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Foreign Exchange 
Rates Archive). 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose:  “The Arsenal Group manages, develops and 
liquidates assets for which it has assumed responsibility, in 
order to ensure optimal financial results under prevailing 
circumstances. Its objective is to minimize any further 
Government investments in the Group and to reduce the 
risk of loss on investments already made” (Arsenal 1995). 
 
Launch dates   Circa end of 1993  
Wind-down dates 1999: more than 90% of 
assets disposed; 
2003: Arsenal placed in 
liquidation; 
2018: one employee remains to 
manage few remaining 
bankruptcies  
Size and type of NPL 
problem 
18.7% at the end of 1993 
(Klingebiel 2000); 
Savings bank loans 
Program size Not specified at outset 
Eligible institutions Initially just the Savings Bank of 
Finland; later expanded to 
include other institutions 
Closed-bank only  
Usage FIM 40 billion  
Outcomes Loss of FIM 20 billion on  
FIM 40 billion in assets  
Ownership structure Public-owned  
Notable features Allowed the banks who bought 
the good assets to give them 
back to Arsenal if they became 
non-performing in the first 
year; allowed Arsenal to 
prioritize the pursuit of bad 








until 2003, at which time losses had reached nearly FIM 20 billion. In the most recent 
available financial statements (2017), Arsenal reported that it was down to one employee 
with just a handful of assets outstanding in domestic and foreign bankruptcy court that 
were expected to be finalized within three years, at which point Arsenal would be 
dissolved.   
Summary Evaluation 
The consensus of a number of academic reviews of the Nordic area crisis and specific 
analyses of Arsenal concludes that Arsenal was provided with the appropriate level of 
funding and professional management necessary and that it operated transparently. 
Arsenal accepted all non-performing loans from the Savings Bank of Finland (similar 
portfolios and no-questions-asked acceptance of non-performing loans were present in the 
other asset management companies that subsequently were joined into the Arsenal Group). 
This feature made it challenging to wind down the portfolio and has contributed to the 
protracted existence of Arsenal, despite an initial five-to-seven-year expected life span. 








Finland – Arsenal: Finland Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$89.2 billion in 1993 
$103.3 billion in 1994 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$17,609 in 1993 
$20,301 in 1994 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
 









Size of banking system 
 
Data not available for 
1993 
Data not available for 
1994 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
 
84.51% in 1993 
73.08% in 1994 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
 
Data not available for 
1993 
Data not available for 
1994 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
 
Data not available for 
1993 
Data not available for 
1994 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
Data not available for 
1993 
Data not available for 
1994 
Government ownership of banking system 
Data not available for 
1993 
Data not available for 
1994 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 1993 
Yes in 1994 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 











During the 1980s in Finland there was a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector as 
outlined in Figure 1. The government allowed banks to lend into areas where they had not 
lent before and therefore lacked market-specific knowledge. Regulatory decisions were 
subject to court challenges, and it has been theorized that this “raised the threshold for 
introducing stricter supervisory practices” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). In addition, 
regulators lifted strict limits on deposit and interest rates. More broadly, the supervisory 
authorities were viewed as relatively weak: “they lacked resources and qualified staff and 
did not prioritise on-site inspections” (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004). The savings banks 
were taking extraordinary risks and were under-capitalized.  
Figure 1: Timeline of market liberalization in Finland  
 
Source: Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994. 
During the same time period, both household and corporate debt increased significantly. 
The Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish “tax systems encouraged borrowing through very 
generous rules for deducting interest expenses from taxable income” (Moe, Solheim, and 
Vale 2004). Household debt rose from 25% of GDP in 1980 to 45% in 1992, and corporate 
debt rose from 70% of GDP to nearly 90% of GDP in just a couple of years starting in 1989.  
Housing prices doubled between 1986 and 1989, and the Finnish stock market tripled in 
value between 1985 and 1988 (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001). Commercial property 






cycle where the increases in property prices lead to higher collateral values, which 
facilitate an increase in bank lending (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004).  
In addition, there were two significant international events that affected the Finnish 
economy in the late ’80s and early ’90s. First, Finland faced significant speculative attacks 
on its currency, which resulted in a major devaluation in September 1992. In an attempt to 
stabilize its currency, the Finnish government tightened monetary policy through rising 
interest rates, which dampened borrowing (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001).  
Second, Finnish exports collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 
2004). The Soviet Union had accounted for approximately 15% of Finnish exports (Mayes, 
Halme, and Liuksila 2001). The decrease in exports to the former Soviet Union caused a 
negative demand shock of approximately 2.5% of GDP to the Finnish economy (Nyberg and 
Vihriälä 1994).  
The Crisis 
Finland was not alone in suffering a banking crisis and economic downturn during the 
early 1990s. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark experienced crises that, although they had 
distinct causes and effects, were similar in many ways. However, Finland suffered the most, 
with a growth rate of negative 8% of GDP during the worst of the crisis years and a peak 
unemployment rate at greater than 20% (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001). See Figure 2. 
Figure 2: GDP growth and unemployment rate in Finland in the 1980s and 1990s 
GDP growth (%) Unemployment (%) 
  
Source: Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001. 
Outstanding loans to the public by all Finnish deposit banks had more than doubled from 
FIM 214 billion to FIM 491 billion from 1985 to 1990 (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). 
Throughout the time period, GDP was growing at a similar pace, so this lending 
represented a consistent 75% of GDP (World Bank n.d.). Then, from 1991 to 1995, bank 
lending fell by more than a third. It would take nine years before bank lending returned to 
the pre-crisis levels (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004). This dramatic buildup and then crash of 
the banking sector can be seen in the two charts in Figure 3, which show the decrease of 
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employment in banking by more than half and, similarly, the closure of more than half of 
physical bank branches. By 1993, nearly one in five loans were non-performing (Klingebiel 
2000). 
Figure 3: Size of banking sector by employment and branches in the 1990s 
Banking employees per 1,000 people Bank branches per 1,000 people 
  
Source: Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001. 
Summary of Finnish Government Actions Leading up to Arsenal 
Skopbank was one of the banks that most embodied the increase in volume and expansion 
into new sectors of lending during the late-1980s boom years. It was a commercial bank 
that served as a central bank or correspondent bank to Finland’s savings banks. Skopbank 
was one of the first institutions to face imminent collapse as the market began to sour. In 
addition to being one of the most aggressive lenders during the “boom years,” Skopbank 
made a large, strategic investment in a multiproduct industrial group that fell sharply with 
the turn in the market (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). Skopbank was controlled and mostly 
owned by the savings banks (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010). 
In 1989 the Bank of Finland, Finland’s central bank, and Finland’s Banking Supervision 
Office, an arm of the Ministry of Finance, began a “special and increasingly strict 
surveillance” of Skopbank’s books (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). In October 1990 a 
restructuring program was designed by the authorities that required that the savings 
banks raise FIM 1.8 billion in capital from private investors for Skopbank. Ultimately, 
however, the capital proved insufficient, and after an acute liquidity crisis in September 
1991, the Bank of Finland took majority control of Skopbank, with 53% of the outstanding 
shares (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010); recapitalized the bank with an initial investment 
of FIM 4 billion in equity; and set up three companies to manage most of the bank’s assets. 
This takeover and equity injection were seen as outside the traditional roles of a central 






In March 1992 the Finnish government provided an FIM 8 billion capital injection program 
to the banking system. Participation in the program was voluntary, but “virtually all banks 
applied and received a share” (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004). The capital was available to 
“all banks regardless of their solvency and in relation to their risk-weighted assets.” By 
December 1992, FIM 7.9 billion of the FIM 8 billion program had been deployed (Nyberg 
and Vihriälä 1994). 
In late April 1992, the Parliament created the off-state-balance-sheet Government 
Guarantee Fund (GGF) (Parliament of Finland 1992) to prevent a collapse in domestic and 
international confidence in the stability of the banking system and its claims. The GGF was 
initially provided with FIM 20 billion in federal funds to use to meet that stated goal. 
However, by the end of the year, three quarters of the money had been spent. In early 1993, 
another FIM 20 billion was made available (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). One of the first 
actions of the GGF was to acquire Skopbank from the Bank of Finland.  
Another significant action taken by the GGF was the June 1992 decision to force the merger 
of 41 of the country’s 81 savings banks into a new entity called the Savings Bank of Finland, 
or SBF. SBF accounted for 23.9% of the total financial system’s assets (Klingebiel 2000). 
The GGF provided the new entity with an initial commitment of FIM 7.2 billion, including 
FIM 5.5 billion in Tier 1 capital and a guarantee for a FIM 1.7 billion subordinated loan. This 
original amount proved insufficient, and multiple rounds of further assistance were 
required. By October 1993 SBF had received a total of FIM 14.5 billion. At that point, the 
GGF sold the healthy parts of SBF, about FIM 41 billion in assets (Nyberg and Vihriälä 
1994), to four competing banks: Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, Union Bank of Finland Ltd, 
Postipankki Ltd, and the Okobank Group (Bank of Finland 1993).  
Program Description 
Financing and Governance of Arsenal 
On November 18, 1993, after FIM 41 billion in healthy assets of the Savings Bank of Finland  
were sold to four large commercial banks, an asset management company called Arsenal 
was formed to handle the remaining FIM 30 billion in unhealthy assets (Nyberg and 
Vihriälä 1994). The new venture was funded by the Government of Finland (Government) 
and the GGF (see Figure 4). In the initial FIM 5 billion capitalization, the Government took a 
74% equity stake and the GGF took 26% (Arsenal 1994). Due to higher than originally 
anticipated losses, the Government made a series of further capital injections: FIM 6 billion 
in 1994, FIM 8 billion in 1995, and FIM 4 billion in 1996 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010). 
The equity balance ultimately shifted slightly to 79% and 21% for the Government and the 
GGF, respectively (Klingebiel 2000). See Figure 4 for a visual representation of Arsenal’s 
financing. 
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Figure 4: Financing of Arsenal 
 
Sources: Klingebiel 2000; Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010. 
Coupled with the FIM 23 billion in total state-injected capital, Arsenal also received an 
unconditional guarantee from the Government of up to FIM 28 billion for all “repayment of 
bonds and other debt financing issued by Arsenal” (Arsenal 1994). The bonds were 
described as “negotiable, State-guaranteed zero-coupon bonds in the form of a book-entry 
security and technically comparable to certificates of deposit issued by commercial banks 
and governments” (Arsenal 1995). Most of the debt had short tenures. However, in 1996, 
two long-term bonds, worth a total of FIM 3 billion, were issued (Arsenal 1996). In its first 
series of public debt issuances, Arsenal sold FIM 20.6 billion (Arsenal 1994). The amount of 


























Figure 5: Arsenal’s issuance of public debt 
 
Sources: Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000. 
The governing structure of Arsenal was designed with a balance of private-sector expertise 
and Government oversight. Of the six members of the board of directors, two were from the 
private sector and four represented the Government. The CEO and other senior 
management members were appointed by the Government from the private sector. 
Oversight of Arsenal was conducted by the GGF, the State Audit Office, and the 
Parliamentary State Auditors (Klingebiel 2000).  
Operations and Assets 
Arsenal became operational on January 15, 1994 (NAOF 2015) and began the process of 
assuming responsibility for the assets the following month. At the outset, the Government 
estimated the time horizon within which Arsenal would be able to divest its assets was five 
to seven years. However, it was noted that, “the divestment process will possibly continue 
after year 2000 if it will assist in reducing the financial burden levied on the Government” 
(Arsenal 1994). 
The non-performing assets acquired by Arsenal were taken at book value. Given the market 
turmoil, it was widely accepted that the book value was substantially higher than the 
market value. This was confirmed in the summer of 1994 when an extensive review was 
conducted by external surveyors to assess the market value of the complete real estate 
portfolio. Based on the estimates, property write-downs amounted to FIM 3.5 billion 
during 1994 (Arsenal 1994). The portfolio included loan receivables, real estate, and other 
assets totaling a book value of FIM 30 billion (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). This included 
15,000 properties and 1,478 companies, of which 95% were real estate companies 
(Arsenal 1995).  
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Assets originally transferred accounted for 5.2% of Finland’s total banking assets and 8.2% 
of GDP (Klingebiel 2000). In addition to the original assets, Arsenal was permitted by law to 
extend additional credit as needed, “in cases where this reduces the total cost to the 
Government” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). Also, the four banks that had acquired the 
healthy assets of SBF were permitted to transfer to Arsenal any of those assets that 
underperformed or became non-performing until the beginning of 1995. Those banks 
transferred an additional FIM 10 billion during 1994, bringing the total assets of Arsenal up 
to FIM 40 billion (Bank of Finland 1994; Arsenal 1994). 
Arsenal’s largest asset disposal of 1995 was the sale of a travel resort, and in 1996 it was a 
golf course (Arsenal 1995; Arsenal 1996). Although Arsenal did not commence any new 
construction projects, it did manage unfinished property developments if it was 
determined that, “the overall result is better than through selling the unfinished project” 
(Arsenal 1994). 
Outcomes 
Expansion to Asset Management Group 
Arsenal began as an asset management company with the sole purpose of managing and 
liquidating the non-performing loans and other assets of the SBF. However, during the 
years following its creation, Arsenal’s purpose was expanded to absorb more troubled 
institutions and assets.  
In the summer of 1993, the GGF split STS Bank, a small, struggling commercial bank, into 
two entities. The entity with healthy assets was bought by KOP Bank, a larger bank. The 
entity with bad assets was renamed Siltapankki, and although officially owned by KOP 
Bank, control of Siltapankki was held by the GGF. In November 1995 Siltapankki was sold 
to Arsenal for only FIM 1 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010).  
In June 1995, the law was changed to allow Arsenal to expand to hold other asset 
management companies. When Arsenal was originally founded, there were certain assets of 
SBF that had not been transferred to Arsenal itself, but rather had been kept as a subsidiary 
bank of Arsenal. In November 1995 the banking charters of this entity (named Arsenal–
SSP) and Siltapankki (renamed Arsenal–Silta) were revoked, and both entities became 
asset management companies (Arsenal 1995).  
The Bank of Finland (the central bank) took over Skopbank, the correspondent bank of 
savings banks, in September 1991. It divided the assets into three holding companies, one 
of which was a real estate asset management company called Sponda (Bank of Finland 
1991). In May 1996, with real estate assets worth FIM 1 billion, it was sold to Arsenal 
(Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012, 694).45 
 
4 The other two holding companies were named Scopulus (which held the shares of Skopbank itself) and 






Wind-Down and Liquidation 
In 1996, the number of debtors being managed by Arsenal Group peaked at 1,584 (Arsenal 
1996). At its height, as seen in Figure 6, Arsenal had a total of 630 employees in 1995 
(Arsenal 2002). By 2003 there were just 13 salaried employees (NAOF 2015).6 In 1997 the 
number of offices was reduced from 22 to 15 (Arsenal 1997) and then from 15 to 6 in 1999 
(Arsenal 1999). See Figure 6 for a representation of these changes. 
Figure 6: Number of Arsenal employees 
 
Source: Arsenal 2002. 
As seen in Figure 7, more than 90% of the peak total assets had been offloaded by 1999 
(NAOF 2015).  
 
June 1992. Solidium was merged into Sponda before Sponda was sold to Arsenal (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012, 
675). 
5 Note that on page 1 of the Arsenal 1997 Annual Report, the entity is called SKOP-Real Estate. 
6 The company also had two liquidators. 
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Figure 7: Total assets held by Arsenal (millions of euros) 
 
Source: NAOF 2015. 
Arsenal was placed in liquidation in October of 2003. The duties of the board of directors 
and managing director were transferred to two liquidators who oversaw a reduction of 
outstanding debtors from more than 1,500 to less than 500 between 2003 and 2014 (NAOF 
2015). According to Arsenal’s 2017 Financial Statements, the most recent available at the 
time of this writing, the liquidation of Arsenal was ongoing, but it was estimated that by the 
end of 2018 there would be only one employee. There were a number of Arsenal assets that 
were going through domestic or foreign bankruptcies. These were expected to close within 
two to three years, at which point Arsenal was expected to dissolve (Arsenal 2017).  
As seen in Figure 8, Arsenal lost nearly FIM 20 billion in the first five years of operation 
(Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998). During the next four years leading up to the 
liquidation, Arsenal turned a small annual profit (Arsenal 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002). At the 









Figure 8: Arsenal’s yearly and cumulative losses 
 
Sources: Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002. 
The approximately FIM 114 billion cost of the rescue of Finland’s financial system has been 
estimated at 17.2% of GDP by 1995. Of this 17.2%, studies have estimated that more than 
half of the Government’s investments were recovered, making for an estimated net cost of 
about 7% of GDP (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001). The funding for Arsenal itself was 
estimated at 6.6% of GDP (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a package: As part of the Government’s resolution of the Savings Bank of 
Finland, Arsenal was created to take over the bad assets. 
The asset management company Arsenal was announced in the Fall of 1993 and became 
operational on January 15, 1994, after multiple steps had been taken by the Finnish 
Government and the Bank of Finland to handle the banking crisis.7 Skopbank, a 
correspondent bank for savings banks, had been taken over by the Bank of Finland. Then 
41 of the nation’s 81 savings banks were forced to merge into a new entity called the 
Savings Bank of Finland. After parts of the healthy pieces of the Savings Bank of Finland 
were sold to four larger banks, Arsenal was created to absorb, manage, and liquidate the 
non-performing assets.  
 
7 Varying sources report different establishment dates in October and November 1993.  
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2. Legal authority: New authority was sought, and granted under the Government 
Guarantee Act of 1992, to create the asset management company Arsenal.  
As the financial crisis began to unfold, the government sought new legal authority to, 
among other actions, establish an asset management company. This authority was granted 
in the Government Guarantee Act of 1992 (Parliament of Finland 1992). In June 1995 a 
significant amendment was made to the original act to allow Arsenal to hold other asset 
management companies (Arsenal 1995). This was necessary to accommodate the 
acquisition of other, smaller asset management companies that had been created during 
the crisis to handle the bad assets of other financial institutions.  
3. Special powers: Arsenal did not possess any notable special powers.  
Arsenal did not have any special powers of note to pursue its mandate.  
4. Mandate: Arsenal’s two guiding principles were minimizing losses incurred by 
the government and investigating irregularities in debtors’ activities.  
According to the first annual report of Arsenal, its assignment was to “manage and 
liquidate, in an orderly manner and at a minimum cost to the Finnish society and its 
taxpayers, the assets and lending activities, of which the responsibility was assumed from 
the former Savings Bank of Finland” (Arsenal 1994). Throughout Arsenal’s lifetime, it 
managed bad loans and sold real estate and other assets (NAOF 2015). 
Arsenal’s other guiding principle was the so-called clarifying objective, alternatively 
translated as an “interest in investigation” of nonpaying debtors.8 Parliament’s view was 
that this objective would serve “the citizens’ sense of justice.” Under this objective, Arsenal 
could allow for a review of debtor irregularities to take priority over the minimization of 
taxpayer losses. In the pursuit of this objective, Arsenal initiated long-term trial and debt 
collection processes against some debtors, rather than quickly liquidating and winding 
them down in the fastest manner possible (NAOF 2015).  
5. Communication: The Government of Finland made a series of increasingly strong 
public statements and commitments regarding their handling of the banking 
crisis.  
The Government of Finland made a number of public statements and commitments 
regarding their plan to contain the banking crisis. In March 1992 a special working group 
formed by the Prime Minister to review the situation published a report encouraging, 
 
8 See the English translation from Finnish: https://www.vtv.fi/julkaisut/omaisuudenhoitoyhtio-arsenal-oyn-
selvitystilan-kaytannot/. The National Audit Office of Finland cited the Parliamentary Finance Committee’s 
definition of this objective: “The bank subsidies should be subjected to more public scrutiny and all 
economically significant credit losses should be thoroughly investigated in connection with the granting of 
the bank subsidies, and the granting of the subsidies should be made conditional on investigating the credit 
losses. Investigated cases involving suspected crimes and offences should be brought before a court, which 
would make them open to public scrutiny. In special audits, opinions should also be expressed on the 






among other actions, the creation of the Government Guarantee Fund. In August 1992 the 
Government announced that it would secure the Finnish banking system under all 
circumstances (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).  
In January 1993 the Government made this final commitment more explicit via a 
Parliamentary Resolution. The resolution stated, “Parliament requires the state to 
guarantee that Finnish banks are able to meet their commitments on time under all 
circumstances. Whenever necessary, Parliament shall grant sufficient appropriations and 
powers to be used by the Government for meeting such commitments” (Nyberg and 
Vihriälä 1994). 
6. Ownership structure: Arsenal was a government-owned asset management 
company. While originally a limited joint stock company operated by the 
Government, Arsenal became a public enterprise in 1998. 
At creation, the Government of Finland owned 74% of the share capital of Arsenal, while 
the Government Guarantee Fund held the remaining shares (Arsenal 1994). Originally 
structured as a limited joint stock company governed by the Government of Finland, 
Arsenal converted to a limited public company in 1998 (Arsenal 1997). 
7. Governance/administration: The board of directors of Arsenal was a mix of 
public and private representatives, overseen by multiple government agencies.  
The board of directors of Arsenal was made up of four members from the government 
sector (the Director General of the State Treasury, the Deputy Head of the Budget 
Department in the Ministry of Finance, the Director of the Government Guarantee Fund 
Board, and the Industrial Counsellor of the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and two 
members from the private sector (Senior Vice President of KOP Bank and CFO of 
Huhtamaki Oy, a food and beverage packaging company). The management team was 
brought from the private sector (the President and CEO came from a Senior Executive Vice 
President role at Partek Corporation, a building materials company). Operations were 
overseen by a number of Government agencies, including: the Government Guarantee 
Fund, the National Audit Office, and Parliamentary State Auditors (Klingebiel 2000).  
Arsenal was required to publish monthly public reports and a full annual report with 
audited financial statements. The company created a website that contained interim 
reports and key figures on the company’s capital and shareholders (Klingebiel 2000).  
In its 1994 Annual Report, Arsenal indicated that it had built an extensive new data system 
to manage the growing number of clients, asset portfolios, and internal employees (Arsenal 
1994).  
8. Size: The Finnish government did not define the size of Arsenal at the outset.  
At its peak at the end of 1994, Arsenal had assets worth FIM 40 billion (Bank of Finland 
1994). Although Arsenal acquired additional assets and asset management companies 
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during the following years, they were disposing of more assets than they were acquiring 
and thus never surpassed the peak size that was reached in the first year (see Arsenal’s 
annual reports for the full financial statements).  
9. Funding source: Arsenal was funded by the Finnish government.  
Primary funding for Arsenal came from the Government Guarantee Fund and the 
Government of Finland. The combined equity capital investments included a total of nearly 
FIM 23 billion: FIM 5 billion in 1993, FIM 6 billion in 1994, FIM 8 billion in 1995, and FIM 4 
billion in 1996 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010). The initial investments allocated 74% 
ownership to the Government and 26% to the GGF (Arsenal 1994). After the subsequent 
rounds of additional capital injections, the Government’s ownership stake increased 
slightly to 79% and the GGF’s ownership decreased to 21% (Klingebiel 2000). GGF’s stake 
in Arsenal was paid for with KOP Bank shares (Arsenal 1994).  
In addition, Arsenal issued mostly short-term, government-guaranteed debt securities on 
the market. In 1996 two long-term bonds, worth a total of FIM 3 billion, were issued with 
the same government guarantee (Arsenal 1996). 
The Government of Finland said in May 1994 that it would guarantee Arsenal’s funding up 
to FIM 28 billion for all “repayment of bonds and other debt financing issued by Arsenal” 
(Arsenal 1994). In December 1996 the guarantee was reduced by FIM 10 billion to FIM 18 
billion (Arsenal 1996). In 1997 it was reduced an additional FIM 3 billion to FIM 15 billion 
(Arsenal 1997). In 1998 it was reduced FIM 6 billion to FIM 9 billion (Arsenal 1998). In 
1999 it was reduced to just FIM 1 billion (Arsenal 1999). In Figure 9, the red line shows the 






Figure 9: Arsenal’s Unconditional guarantees and debt issuances 
 
Sources: Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000. 
10. Eligible institutions: Initially, Arsenal took on assets only from the Savings Bank 
of Finland. Over time, additional assets were acquired from a handful of other 
banks and asset management companies.  
Arsenal was founded with the purpose of taking on the bad assets of the Savings Bank of 
Finland (SBF), itself created through the forced merger of 41 of the country’s 81 savings 
banks (Arsenal 1994). Over time Arsenal accepted assets from other institutions and even 
transformed into a group with its holdings of other asset management companies. In March 
1995 Siltapankki, an asset management company handling the non-performing assets of 
STS–Bank was acquired by Arsenal (Arsenal 1995). Also, real estate assets worth FIM 1 
billion were transferred from Skopbank in May 1996 (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012, 694; 
Arsenal 1997). See Figure 10 for an organization chart of Arsenal. 
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Figure 10: Arsenal organization chart 
 
Source: Arsenal 1997. 
Beyond the four institutions that took the healthy assets of SBF, there was no period in 
which Arsenal accepted non-performing assets from the broader banking or any other 
sector.  
11. Eligible assets: Arsenal accepted all non-performing assets of the Savings Bank of 
Finland.  
Arsenal took on all non-performing assets of the Savings Bank of Finland. According to a 
report by the World Bank, the asset portfolio of Arsenal broke down as follows: Real estate 
33.7%; client receivables 41%; and other assets 25.3% (Klingebiel 2000; Arsenal 1996). 
The four institutions that acquired the healthy assets of SBF were permitted to return any 
of those assets that became non-performing during the first year of operation (Bank of 
Finland 1994). 
12. Acquisition mechanics: After acquiring the entirety of the non-performing assets 
from the Savings Bank of Finland, Arsenal obtained further assets on a case-by-
case basis. 
During the following years, when additional assets and/or asset management companies 
were acquired, acquisitions were done in single transactions and not during a specified, 
open purchase window.  
Arsenal Group 






13. Acquisition pricing: The assets acquired by Arsenal were priced at their original 
book value, an amount significantly higher than the market value of the time.  
Arsenal acquired the non-performing assets of the Savings Bank of Finland at their original 
book values. The book values were significantly higher than the market value of the time 
(Arsenal 1994).  
14. Disposal: Arsenal prioritized achieving the best return for its portfolio over the 
prompt disposal of assets.  
In the summer of 1994, shortly after the initial asset acquisition, Arsenal hired outside 
surveyors to conduct a valuation of the entire real estate portfolio (Arsenal 1994). This 
valuation was conducted to assist in the disposal of the assets and did not affect the 
acquisition price.  
15. Timeframe: Arsenal did not have a target end date, with the first annual report 
estimating a five-to-seven-year lifespan. 
When Arsenal was created, it was not given a target end date or sunset clause. The first 
annual report estimated that activities would last between five to seven years, with a plan 
to divest by the end of 2000; however, it was noted that “the divestment process will 
possibly continue after year 2000 if it will assist in reducing the financial burden levied on 
the Government” (Arsenal 1994). 
More than 90% of the assets had been sold or written off by 1999. In 2003 Arsenal was 
placed in liquidation (NAOF 2015). In 2017 Arsenal was down to a single employee 
managing a handful of final bankruptcies that were expected to be finalized within three 
years (Arsenal 2017). 
The National Audit Office of Finland wrote in 2015 that the pursuit of debtors under 
Arsenal’s clarifying objective mandate was “one of the main reasons why Arsenal has 
remained operational for considerably longer than was anticipated at the establishment of 
the company” (NAOF 2015). 
III. Evaluation 
A review of the banking crises in the Nordic countries during the early 1990s concluded 
that, “creditors’ confidence in the banking systems was quickly restored, banks returned to 
profitability fairly quickly, and the impact on the economies of the banking problems 
seemed fairly modest.” The authors of the review also made positive conclusions regarding 
the amount of transparency in the creation and management of the asset management 
companies (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004).  
A similar cross-country examination of asset management companies by the World Bank 
emphasized that, “Arsenal was provided with appropriate funding, had professional 
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management, and a skilled human resource base” (Klingebiel 2000). However, because 
Arsenal had accepted all non-performing loans regardless of asset type or size, the wind-
down strategy was slowed because they had to hire a large number of professional staff to 
value, manage, and sell the assets. Also, due to the nature of the wide range of real estate 
and other assets under management, Arsenal wasn’t able to use “wholesale divestiture 
techniques.” A favorable factor, the World Bank noted, was that “appropriate funding 
allowed Arsenal to market assets to market value after their transfer” (Klingebiel 2000). 
A 2015 audit of the liquidation of Arsenal was commissioned by the Finnish government. 
One of their conclusions was that due to the built-in unknown of how long it would take an 
asset management company to divest itself of its holdings, “public receivership should also 
be considered as an alternative.” Additionally, as a result of the so-called clarifying 
objective, Arsenal committed to long-term trial and debt collection processes rather than 
simply liquidating quickly, which led to Arsenal’s lifespan lasting much longer than 
expected (NAOF 2015).  
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